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In an approach broadening incentives to non-economic dimensions, we analytically investigate decentralized incentives, exogenous shocks and self-selection in explaining political violence in civil conflicts and wars. The focus in on the mechanisms that trigger individuals' decisions to: (1) join the combatants, (2) actually fight, or (3) donate resources to support the combatants.
In a game theory model of self-sorting into combatant vs. producer roles, we identify some main driving forces that trigger violent conflicts: opportunistic versus defence incentives, and coordination of producers and combatants through transfers and protection. We derive economic, demographic and ideological determinants of (1) the share of loot allocated to soldiers, (2) the relative size of the army, and (3) the soldiers' fighting intensity. Beyond a rich comparative statics, three increasingly violent types of society emerge from the analysis that may explain violence escalation. We discuss the existence and uniqueness of the conflict equilibrium and efficiency issues.
