Theoretical considerations
on the retirement consumption puzzle
and the optimal age of retirement

Nicolas Drouhin*

February 1, 2018

VERY PRELIMINARY VERSION

Abstract

Defining retirement as a discontinuity in the labor supply of the agent, this paper resolves the retirement consumption puzzle in very general model of intertemporal choice of consumption ans savings of a fully rational, forward looking, agent. Building on a specific version of Bellman (1957) principle of optimality, it provides a very general and parsimonious formula for determining the optimal age of retirement taking into account the possible discontinuity of the optimal consumption profile at the age of retirement.

Code JEL: C61 D91 J26

Key words: life cycle theory of consumption and saving; optimal retirement, retirement consumption puzzle, discontinuous optimal control.

*Ecole normale supérieure Paris-Saclay and CREST (UMR CNRS 9194)
1 Introduction

In this article, we build a model that addresses at the same time the retirement consumption puzzle and the optimal age of retirement.

Since Hamermesh (1984a) many empirical studies document a drop in consumption at retirement, the retirement consumption puzzle (Banks et al., 1998; Bernheim et al., 2001; Battistin et al., 2009, among others). This phenomena is seen as puzzling and "paradoxical" because it seems in contradiction with the idea that, within the intertemporal choice model, which is the backbone of modern economics, when preferences are convex, consumption smoothing is the rule. Then, explanation of this paradox has been searched in relaxing some assumptions of the model of fully rational forward looking agent. For example the agent may systematically underestimate the drop in earnings associated with retirement (Hamermesh, 1984a). Or, the agent may not be fully time consistent as in the hyperbolic discounting model (Angeletos et al., 2001).

Without denying that those phenomena may be important traits of "real" agents behavior, this paper will emphasize the point that a closer look at the intertemporal choice model of consumption and savings in continuous time allows to understand that what is smooth in the model is not necessarily consumption, but marginal utility of consumption. Of course, if consumption is the only variable of the utility function the two properties are equivalent. But if utility is multivariate, any discontinuity in a dimension, may imply an optimal discontinuity response in the others. I will illustrate that insight into a very general model of inter-temporal choice that can be considered as a realistic generalisation of the basic one. Two ingredients will be required. First, we will assume a bivariate, additively intertemporally separable utility function that depends on consumption and leisure. Second we will assume, realistically, that retirement is not a smooth process with a per period duration of labor that tend progressively to zero, but a discontinuous process.
I will show that, as long as the per period utility function is not additively separable in consumption and leisure, discontinuity of the consumption function is the rule in this general model. However, as insightful is the preceding statement, it is not so easy to prove it formally, with all generality because our assumptions imply a discontinuous payoff function, a case that is not standard with usual intertemporal optimization techniques in continuous time. I will provide a general and simple lemma that will make the problem tractable and it’s resolution at the same time rigourous and insightful.

So, if we want to solve the paradox within a quite standard model of intertemporal choice, we have to drop additive separability of utility of consumption and leisure. And if we want to extend the problem to the choice of the optimal retirement age, we have to carry on with this non-separability. However, as pointed by Albis (d’) et al. (2012) most of the study addressing the question has been made precisely under the assumption of additive separability in consumption and leisure (see Albis (d’) and Augeraud-Véron, 2008; Bloom et al., 2014; Boucekkine et al., 2002; Hazan, 2009; Heijdra and Mierau, 2012; Heijdra and Romp, 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil, 2010; Prettner and Canning, 2014; Sheshinski, 1978, among others). And if there are some important papers that study a general life cycle model of consumption and savings, without additive separability of consumption and leisure (Heckman, 1974, 1976; Büttler, 2001) they are mostly focused on the the explanation of co-movement of earnings and consumption all over the life-cycle. Hamermesh (1984b) and Chang (1991) study the retirement decision with non separability of consumption and leisure, but they fully endogenize the work decision, without any granularity concerning the per-period duration of worktime, and thus without any discontinuity of per period labor supply, implying model that are unable to explain at the same time retirement consumption paradox and the retirement decision. The model I propose can easily be expanded to endogenize the retirement decision and provide very general condition that fulfills the optimal age of retirement. I will show that when optimal consumption is discontinuous at the age of retirement, this condition is qualitatively very different than in the traditional case.
2 A general Life Cycle Model solving the retirement consumption paradox

Let’s assume that we are in a very standard continuous time life-cycle model of consumption and savings with preference for leisure and retirement.

\[
P = \begin{cases} 
\max \int_t^T e^{-\theta(s-t)} u(c(s), l(s)) \, ds \\
s.t. \forall s \in [t, T], \quad \dot{a}(s) = ra(s) + w(s) - c(s) \\
a(t) \text{ given and } a(T) \geq 0
\end{cases}
\]

\( t \) is the decision date and \( T \) is life duration, \( w \) is the non financial income (may be salaries or pensions), \( c \) is the intertemporal consumption profile, the control variable of the program, \( a \) is a lifecycle asset, the state variable of the program. \( w \) and \( c \) are assumed to be piecewise continuous and \( a \) is assumed to be piecewise smooth.

We assume that the utility function is standard: \( u_1 > 0, u_2 > 0, u_{11} < 0 \) and \( u_{22} < 0 \). Moreover we assume that \( u \) is strictly quasiconcave (i.e. the indifference curves are convex). It implies that \(-u_{11}u_2^2 + 2u_{12}u_1u_2 - u_{22}u_1^2 > 0\). It is important to notice that, without further assumptions, the sign of the second order crossed derivative is undetermined.

We will assume that there exists a retirement age \( t_R \) such that:

\[
\begin{cases} 
\forall s \in [t, t_R), \quad l(s) = 0 \\
\forall s \in [t_R, T], \quad l(s) = 1
\end{cases}
\]

Of course this assumption is a simplification, but it allows to characterize directly the central idea of the paper: retirement is fundamentally a discontinuity in the labor/leisure profile. This assumption seems much more realistic than usual idea that retirement is the smooth process with per period work duration tending to zero at the
We denote $c^*$ the optimal consumption profile, solution of the program $P$ and $a^*$ the associated value of the state variable. Of course those optimal functions are parameterized by all the given of the problem $(t, t_R, T, a(t), r, w)$.

We denote $V^*$ the optimal value of the problem i.e.

$$V^*(t, t_R, T, a(t), r, w) = \int_t^T e^{-\theta(s-t)}u(c^*(t, t_R, T, a(t), r, w, s), l(s)) \, ds$$

Because of the discontinuity of the instantaneous payoff function in $t_R$, the problem is non standard. Therefore it is useful to decompose the problem in two separate ones:

$$P^0 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \ quad
1. \( V^*(t, t_R; T, a(t), r, w) = (t, t_R, a(t), a^*(t_R), r, w) + V^{1*}(t_R, T, a^*(t_R), r, w) \)

2. \( a^*(t_R) = \arg\max_{a(t_R)} \{ V^0(t, t_R, a(t), a(t_R), r, w) + V^1(t_R, T, a(t_R), r, w) \} \)

**Proof:** It is a direct application of Bellman (1957) principle of optimality. \( \square \)

**Proposition 1** (Discontinuity of the consumption profile).

*If we denote \( c^0(t_R) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \lim_{s \to t_R} c^0(s) \), and restrict our analysis to per period utility function that are either, everywhere strictly positive, everywhere strictly negative or everywhere equal to zero:

1. The optimal consumption profile is unique.

2. The optimal consumption profile continuous for every age \( s \) in \([t, t_R) \cup (t_R, T]\).

3. In \( t_R \), \( u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) = u_1(c^1(t_R), 1) \) and the continuity of the optimal consumption profile is determined solely by the sign of the cross derivative of the per period utility function.

   (a) \( c^0(t_R) > c^1(t_R) \Leftrightarrow u_{12}(c, l) < 0 \)

   (b) \( c^0(t_R) = c^1(t_R) \Leftrightarrow u_{12}(c, l) = 0 \)

   (c) \( c^0(t_R) < c^1(t_R) \Leftrightarrow u_{12}(c, l) > 0 \)

**Proof:** Relying on Lemma 1, we start by solving the program \( \mathcal{P}^0 \) and \( \mathcal{P}^1 \) for a given \( a(t_R) \). Denoting \( \mu^0 \) the costate variable, the Hamiltonian of the Program \( \mathcal{P}^0 \) is:

\[
\mathcal{H}^0(c(s), a(s), \mu^0(s), s) = e^{-\theta(s-t)} u(c(s), l(s)) + \mu^0(s)[r a(s) + w(s) - c(s)] \quad (1)
\]

According to Pontryagin maximum principle the necessary condition for optimality is:

\[
\forall s \in [t, t_R), \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}^0(\bullet)}{\partial c(s)} = 0 \Rightarrow \mu^0(s) = e^{-\theta(s-t)} u_1(c(s), l(s)) \quad (2)
\]

\[
\forall s \in [t, t_R), \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}^0(\bullet)}{\partial a(s)} = -\mu^0(s) \Rightarrow \dot{\mu}^0(s) = -r \mu^0(s) \quad (3)
\]
Moreover by construction of the Hamiltonian and Pontryagin maximum principle it is well known that:

$$\frac{\partial V^0(t, t_R, a(t), a(t_R), r, w)}{\partial a(t_R)} = -\mu^0(t_R)$$

(5)

Similarly for program $P^1$, we have:

$$\mathcal{H}^1(c(s), a(s), \mu^1(s), s) = e^{-\theta(s-t)}u(c(s), l(s)) + \mu^1(s) [r a(s) + w(s) - c(s)]$$

(6)

$$\forall s \in (t_R, T], \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}^1}{\partial c(s)} = 0 \Rightarrow \mu^1(s) = e^{-\theta(s-t)}u_1(c(s), l(s))$$

(7)

$$\forall s \in (t_R, T], \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}^1}{\partial a(s)} = -\dot{\mu}^1(s) \Rightarrow \dot{\mu}^1(s) = -r \mu^0(s)$$

(8)

$$\forall s \in (t_R, T], \dot{a}(s) = ra(s) + w(s) - c(s)$$

(9)

$$\frac{\partial V^{1*}(t, t_R, a(t), a(t_R), r, w)}{\partial a(t_R)} = \mu^1(t_R)$$

(10)

Moreover, $P^1$ being a constrained endpoint problem, we have to fulfill the transversality condition:

$$\mu^1(T)a(T) = 0 \Rightarrow a(T) = 0$$

(11)

$P^0$ and $P^1$ verifying the standard strict convexity condition, they both admit continuous and unique solution on their respective domain. Let us now turn to the solution problem of the optimal value of the asset at retirement date $a^*(t_R)$

Relaying on the principle of optimality (Lemma 1), a necessary condition for $a^*(t_R)$ to be a maximum of $(V^0(\bullet) + V^1(\bullet))$ is:

$$\frac{\partial V^0(\bullet)}{\partial a(t_R)} + \frac{V^1(\bullet)}{\partial a(t_R)} = -\mu^0(t_R) + \mu^1(t_R) = 0 \Leftrightarrow u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) = u_1(c^1(t_R), 1)$$

(12)

It is easy to check that the left hand term of the last equality is increasing in $a(t_R)$ while the right hand one is decreasing, assuring the uniqueness of $a^*(t_R)$. If for all $c, l$
in $\mathbb{R}^+ \times [0,1]$, $u_{12} < 0$, then $u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) < u_1(c^0(t_R), 1)$. Because $u_{11} < 0$, we can only have $u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) = u_1(c^1(t_R), 1)$, if and only if $c^0(t_R) > c^1(t_R)$. The reasoning is the same for the two other cases. \(\square\)

In this setting, a negative cross derivative of the per period utility of consumption and leisure is necessary to obtain a discontinuous drop in consumption at the age of retirement, i.e. to resolve the retirement consumption puzzle. It means that, if we believe that the model is a proper simplification of the intertemporal choice of agent in the real world, the observation of that kind of drop, informs us on the negative sign of the cross derivative. It may seems strange because many workhorse utility function in labor economics such as the cobb-Douglas or the CES utility function are characterized by a positive cross derivative.

However, it is important to notice that relying on a different model of intertemporal choice with full endogeneity of labor, Heckman (1974) also conclude that a negative cross derivative of the per period utility of consumption and leisure was required to explain the hump shape of the intertemporal consumption profile.

3 Optimal age of retirement

We can now turn our attention to the optimal age of retirement.

**Proposition 2** (The optimal age of retirement).

When an interior solution exists, the optimal age of retirement $\hat{t}_R$ is such that:

\[
\mathcal{H}^0(c^0(\hat{t}_R), a^0(\hat{t}_R), \mu^0(\hat{t}_R), \hat{t}_R) = \mathcal{H}^1(c^1(\hat{t}_R), a^1(\hat{t}_R), \mu^1(\hat{t}_R), \hat{t}_R)
\]

\[
\iff u(c^0(t_R), 0) - u(c^1(t_R), 1) + u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) \left[ w^0(t_R) - w^1(t_R) - c^0(t_R) + c^1(t_R) \right] = 0
\]

(13)

**Proof:** $\hat{t}_R$ is a solution of $\max_{\hat{t}_R} V^*(t, t_R, T, a(t), r, w)$. Because $V*$ is continuous and
differentiable in $t_R$, a necessary condition for having an interior solution is:

$$\frac{\partial V^*(t, t_R, T, a(t), r, w)}{\partial t_R} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Relying on Lemma 1 and noting that by construction of the Hamiltonian and Pontrya-gin maximum principle:

$$\frac{\partial V^0(t, t_R, a(t), r, w)}{\partial t_R} = \mathcal{H}^0(c^0(t_R), a^0(t_R), \mu^0(t_R), t_R)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial V^1(t_R, T, a(t), r, w)}{\partial t_R} = -\mathcal{H}^1(c^1(t_R), a^1(t_R), \mu^1(t_R), t_R)$$

we can easily prove the left hand side of the equivalence in (13). Using the definitions of the Hamiltonian and first order conditions of program $\mathcal{P}^0$ and $\mathcal{P}^1$ and remembering that, in any case, $a$ is continuous in $t_R$, we get the right hand side. \hspace{1cm} \square

Proposition 2 provide a very general characterisation of the optimal retirement age. To understand our contribution let us stat by examining the special (but usual) case of additive separability in consumption and leisure.

Corollary 2-a.

When the per period utility function is additively separable (i.e. $u_{12} = 0$), denoting $\beta(s)$ the utility of being retired, the optimal age of retirement $\hat{t}_R$ is such that:

$$\beta(t_R) = u_1(c^0(t_R), 0) \left[ w^0(t_R) - w^1(t_R) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

This a standard marginal condition for optimality. The left hand side is the direct cost in utility of a marginal increase in the retirement age and the right hand size is the marginal utility equivalent of an increase in wealth due to a longer work duration.

In the general version of Equation (13) the direct utility premium depends on the level of consumption before and after retirement because of the non separability and the
right hand size also depend on the drop of consumption (with a same post retirement earning a lower consumption implies a lower effect on wealth).

We also have to remark that, when expanding consumption before and after retirement as implicit function of the parameter of the problem, Proposition 2 allows to derive comparative static results on the optimal age of retirement.

4 Conclusion

This short paper provide a general methodology to resolve the retirement consumption puzzle and the choice of the optimal age of retirement. The principle is illustrated in simple model of intertemporal choice in which utility depend on consumption and leisure with certain horizon. But the method is general and can easily be extended in more general model with uncertain lifetime.

References


